Kirk Holdings Pty Limited (Company) was the owner of a farm near Picton, New South Wales. Mr Kirk was a director of the Company but had no farming experience and left the day-to-day management of the farm to Mr Graham Palmer. Mr Palmer had over 20 years experience as a farmer and had a large property of his own.
On 28 March 2001, Mr Palmer was killed whilst driving an All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) owned by the Company. Rather than using an established road, Mr Palmer had directed the ATV down the side of hill causing the ATV to overturn.
The Company and Mr Kirk were charged with breaches of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (NSW) (Act) (the predecessor legislation to the current act), for failing to ensure the health and safety of the farm's employees.
At first instance, the Industrial Court convicted both Mr Kirk and the Company and financial penalties were imposed. Mr Kirk subsequently appealed this decision to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the Court of Appeal contending that the nature of the charges against him made compliance with the Act impossible. The matter was eventually brought before the High Court.
There are important issues in the judgment in terms of the nature of the obligations placed upon duty holders, as well as significant criticisms of the practice and procedure of safety prosecutions in NSW.
The High Court was highly critical of the way in which the charges against both the Company and Mr Kirk were drafted. Effectively, the Prosecution had simply taken the words from the legislation and applied them to the use of an ATV. In doing so, the Prosecution relied on a principle which stated that the Prosecutor did not have to specifically identify what measures a defendant should have taken to avoid a risk. The High Court has now dismissed this principle as being contrary to the intention of the legislation.
The High Court held that, the legislation requires the charges to identify the measures which should have been taken by the defendants to obviate an identifiable risk. This requires the statement of the charge to be more specific than simply stating for example, that the defendant "failed to ensure the health and safety of employees." The High Court said that "It must specifically consider what constituted the risk and what particular measures should have been taken by the employer to address or obviate that risk."
By requiring the Prosecutor to plead the charges in this way, the Defendant will then be in a position to know whether or not it will be possible to make out a defence with respect to those allegations. The defences available in New South Wales are to the effect that the defendant had done all that was reasonably practicable to avoid this risk. This question frequently has been at large in safety prosecutions in New South Wales. The High Court is now effectively directing the Prosecution to particularise allegations in a manner which will enable them to be more properly understood and responded to by Defendants.
If you are currently a defendant or involved in a prosecution, you will need to review closely the nature of any charge which you are currently facing because the High Court has effectively dismissed longstanding prosecutorial practice in NSW.
During the hearing at first instance it was agreed by both parties that Mr Kirk would appear as a witness for the Prosecutor. The High Court was highly critical of this approach stating that the Industrial Court is bound by the rules of evidence in criminal proceedings which clearly provide that a defendant may not appear as a witness for the Prosecution. According to Justice Heydon, this requirement "is an absolutely fundamental rule underpinning the whole accusatorial and adversarial system of criminal trial in New South Wales." It was not open to the Industrial Court to dispense with this requirement, irrespective of any agreement made by the parties. To do so constituted a jurisdictional error and in addition to the errors in the construction of the duty imposed on employers required the convictions of both Mr Kirk and the Company to be quashed.
Whilst Justice Heydon agreed with the majority's decision in substance, he provided his own further reasons for his decision and was highly critical of the approach taken by both the Industrial Court and WorkCover NSW.
Justice Heydon felt that the prosecutions against Mr Kirk and the Company should never have been instituted. The accident occurred in circumstances where Mr Palmer, a man of optimum skill and experience, had been inexplicably reckless. It was therefore absurd to prosecute the owner of a farm on the basis that he failed to ensure the health and safety of his employee.
Further he thought the emphasis placed on Mr Kirk's failure to supervise his employees on a daily basis was astonishing. He held that to require farm owners that do not live on or near their properties to supervise their staff on a daily basis is an obligation that in many instances will be impossible for farm owners to comply with these requirements. This will have significance on the emphasis placed on issues of supervision and reliance placed upon known expertise in future OHS prosecutions.
The decision is likely to have four main impacts for the conduct of future OH&S prosecutions.